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RECENT INNOVATIONS TO PRETRIAL
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS: RULE 37
REINTERPRETED
WORKING to eliminate the procedural maze which had developed in
the federal courts, the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
produced what has been described as the "simplest and least technical
procedure yet devised in Anglo-American jurisprudence."' The basic
philosophy of the Rules is unmistakable.' The draftsmen sought to
relieve federal procedure of both the rigidity of the pre-1938 Codes and
the last vestiges of common law pleading which constituted federal pro-
cedure under the late Conformity Act.' An additional goal of the
draftsmen was to soften, as far as practicable, the rigors of the Anglo-
American adversary system. The result was a mechanism highly con-
ducive to the determination of cases on their merits rather than on
procedural niceties.4
' Holtzoff, Origins and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 3o N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1057, 1058 (1955).
'"The underlying philosophy of the new procedure may be said to consist of two
distinctive stands. The first is a shift of emphasis from rigid adherence to a prescribed
procedure to a distinct effort to bring about the disposition of every case on its merits
without regard to compliance with detailed requirements of adjective law and over-
looking any discrepancy or error that does not actually affect the substantive rights of
the parties.... Id. at io59. The second facet of the philosophy... is... [an] even
greater departure from the ancient moorings. It consists of a modification of the theory
of the adversary type of legal procedure, which is part of the warp and woof of Anglo-
Saxon jurisprudence and which distinguishes [it] from continental systems." Id. at
xo6o.
"What is the fundamental philosophy behind the Federal Rulesi In a nutshell, it is
that common sense should prevail over the technicalities which grow up under the
common law and code system. It aims to direct a fair pattern of procedural steps to
be taken but to permit flexibility where the ends of justice will be subserved." Atkinson,
Parties and Pleadings in the Missouri Proposed Code of Civil Procedure, 7 Mo. L.
REv. 27, 28 (-941).
3 17 Stat. 196 (1872).
'"[I]n 1938, when the federal rules became effective, they replaced the most
confused, irrational, and incomprehensible procedural system that one could imagine.
Theoretically, the federal court practice in any particular case on the law side was
supposed to follow the procedure in the state where the case was brought. And in
equity, the practice was largely prescribed by a short set of rules that had been promul-
gated . . . in x92.... The fact that the two classes of civil litigation were processed
under totally different procedural systems was bad enough. But particularly in law
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It has been said that the "elimination of the 'sporting theory' of
justice, the simplification of procedure, and the prompt disposition of
controversies on their merits are the great ojectives of the new federal
civil practice."5 To achieve these aims, liberal pretrial discovery de-
vices were incorporated in rules 26 through 36, and sanctions designed
to insure compliance with these rules were provided by rule 37.7
cases, the idea of conformity to state practice . . had failed miserably in operation.
There is no need . . . to recapitulate all of its many well-known defects." Tolman,
Discovery under the Federal Rules: Production of Documents and the Work Product
of the Lawyer, 58 COLuM. L. REV. 498, 499 (i958).
"[In 1938] civil procedure in the federal courts was . . . in a state of chaos ...
[T]here were forty-nine different categories of procedure . . . in actions at law, one
in each of the states, and one in the District of Columbia. The various kinds of practice
ranged from original, simon-pure common-law pleading to code pleading in its different
varieties." Holtzoff, Origins and Sources of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30
N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1057 (1955). See also note 2 supra.
Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41
MICH. L. REV. 205 (1942).
'The array of discovery devices contained in rules z6 through 36 include: liberal
and extensive deposition rights (rules 26 through 32), interrogatories to parties (rule
33) i discovery and production of documents and things for inspection, copying or
photographing (rule 34)i physical and mental examinations of persons (rule 35).i and
the admission of facts and of the genuineness of documents (rule 36).
" "Rule 37. Refusal to Make Discovery: Consequences
"(a) Refusal to Answer. If a party or other deponent refuses to answer any ques-
tion propounded upon oral examination, the examination shall be completed on other
matters or adjourned, as the proponent of the question may prefer. Thereafter, on
reasonable notice to all persons affected thereby, he may apply to the court in the
district where the deposition is taken for an order compelling an answer. Upon the
refusal of a deponent to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rule 31 or upon the
refusal of a party to answer any interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, the proponent
of the question may on like notice make like application for such an order. If the
motion is granted and if the court finds that the refusal was without substantial -justifica-
tion the court shall require the refusing party or deponent and the party or attorney
advising the refusal or either of them to pay to the examining party the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney's fees.
If the motion is denied and if the court finds that the motion was made without sub-
stantial justification, the court shall require the examining party or the attorney advising
the motion or both of them to pay to the refusing party or witness the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's fees.
"(b) Failure to Comply With Order.
"(I) Contempt. If a party or other witness refuses to be sworn or refuses to
answer any question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in -which
the deposition is being taken, the refusal may be considered a contempt of that tourt.
"(2) Other Consequences. If any party or an officer or managing agent of a party
refuses to obey an order made under subdivision (a) of this rule requiring him- to
answer designated questions, or an order made under Rule 34 to produce any document
or other thing for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit it to be done; or
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Rule 37 has been left untouched by the successive proposals of the
Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure, although recom-
mendations to amend other rules have frequently been offered." Yet,
the Committee's evident satisfaction with the rule is not shared by all.
Professor Rosenberg and others have criticized rule 37 as being in-
to permit entry upon land or other property, or an order made under Rule 35 requiring
him to submit to a physical or mental examination, the court may make such orders in
regard to the refusal as are just, and among others the following:
"Q() An order that the matters regarding which the questions were asked, or the
character or description of the thing or land, or the contents of the paper, or the physical
or mental condition of the party, or any other designated fact shall be taken to be
established for the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order5
"(ii) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose desig-
nated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing in evidence designated
documents or things or items of testimony, or from introducing evidence of physical or
mental condition;
"1(iin) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default agaist the disobedient party;
"4(iv) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order di-
recting the arrest of any party or agent of a party for disobeying any of such orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
"(c) Expenses on Refusal to Admit. If a party, after being served with a request
under Rule 36 to admit the genuineness of any documents or the truth of any matters
of fact, serves a sworn denial thereof and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter
proves the genuineness of any such document or the truth of any such matter of fact,
he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the reason-
able expenses incurred in making such proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. Un-
less the court finds that there were good reasons for the denial or that the admissions
sought were of no substantial importance, the order shall be made.
"(d) Failure of Party to Attend or Serve Answers. If a party or an officer or
managing agent of a party wilfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his
deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interroga-
tories submitted under Rule 33, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court
on motion and notice may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or
dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default
against that party.
"(c) Failure to Respond to Letters Rogatory. A subpoena may be issued as provided
in Title 28 U.S.C., § 1783, under the circumstances and conditions therein stated. As
amended Dec. 29, 1948, eff. Oct. 2o, 1949.
"(f) Expenses Against the United States. Expenses and attorney's fees are not to
be imposed upon the United States under this rule."
OADv soity COMmITrEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTs TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
CoURTs 45-7 (1955). This report constitutes the most recent recommendations by
the Advisory Committee for changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No sig-
nificant changes have been made in rule 37 since its original enactment.
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effective, ambiguous, and of inadequate support to the procedures made
available by rules 26 through 360
One basic difficulty in the administration of rule 37 springs from
the simple fact that the rule is not explicitly stated to be the exclusive
source of judicial sanctions supporting the discovery rules. There can
be little doubt that the authors of the Rules intended it to be so.10 With
increasing frequency, however, courts have gone outside rule 37, basing
punishments for noncompliance with discovery orders upon rule 4i(b)
or upon so called "inherent powers."'" The unfortunate result has been
a wide divergence in sanctions actually applied.
Aside from what rule 37 does not say, grave difficulties are also
caused by what it does say. The main caption of the rule, for example,
is "Refusal to Make Discovery5 Consequences." (Emphasis added.)
Yet, its four subdivisions alternate between the words "refusal" and
"failure." Since "refusal" connotes intentional noncompliance and
"failure" suggests omissive noncompliance, district court judges have
been uncertain as to exactly what behavior will properly warrant invoca-
tion of the sanctions of rule 37.12
Again, the word "wilfully," though it appears but once,'" has caused
trouble, some judges and commentators contending and others denying14
* "[T]wenty years of use have exposed enough flaws in language, gaps in coverage,
and anomalies in application to warrant its revision." Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectu-
ate Prstrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 480, 486 (.958).
" "Rule 37 was unmistakably designed to generate the principal enforcement power
behind the array of discovery procedures and was doubtless intended to be the exclusive
source of authority to punish evasion." Id. at 483.
"' Other alternative sources of sanctioning power, aside from rule 4 1(b) and "in-
herent powers," are rule 4 5 (f), which concerns itself with subpoenas, and various federal
contempt statutes, notably I8 U.S.C. § 401 (1952) (formerly z8 U.S.C. § 385 (1940)),
and I Stat. 73 (789), (repealed, 6z Stat. 984 (1948) because it was superseded by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
'Brookdale Mill, Inc. v. Rowley, zig F.zd 728 (6th Cir. 1954)5 Valenstein v.
Bayonne Bolt Corp., 6 F.R.D. 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Dulin v. West, o FEn. RULES
SERV. 3 7 d. 3 3 , Case I (W.D. Mo. Nov. 30, 1946).
' FED. R. Civ. p. 37(d).
"The federal courts are in total disagreement on the necessity of wilfulness as a
prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions under rule 37. A substantial number of cases
have been decided without any allusion to the issue of wilfulness. A recent case,
Milewski v. Schneider Transportation Co., 238 F.2d 397 (6th Cir. 1956), which in-
volved an action under the Jones Act, was dismissed by the district court because the
plaintiff failed to respond to interrogatories. Though the lower court made no refer-
ence to wilfulness the court of appeals affirmed in a per curiam decision, merely noting
that "the district judge did not abuse his discretion." Id. at 398. The following
cases have employed a similar approach: Scheser v. American Milk Products Co., Inc.,
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that "wilfulness" is always a prerequisite to the meting out of sanctions
under the rule.
And lurking within the text of rule 37, there is potentially still an-
other problem: Under what circumstances does a dismissal for non-
compliance with discovery rules without full adjudication on the merits
comport with the constitutional requirements of due process?
In Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Coln-
merciales, S.A. v. Rogers," the Supreme Court took a giant step toward
resolution of some of these problems. This case involved a Swiss hold-
ing company which had brought an action under section 9(a) of the
Trading with the Enemy Act10 to recover assets seized by the Custodian
of Enemy Property during World War II. The Custodian had found
that the more than $ioo,ooo,ooo of assets involved in the Societe Inter-
nationale case were actually owned or held for the benefit of the I. G.
Farbenindustrie, a then enemy firm.
At an early stage in the proceedings, the Government sought, under
rule 34, an order compelling the production of a large number of papers,
documents, and books allegedly in the possession or control of the plain-
tiff. The motion was granted, and the corporation actually produced
a substantial quantity of the requested materials, both in Washington
and to government agents in Switzerland. . Full compliance was pre-
vented when the Swiss Attorney General, acting under his country's eco-
nomic secrecy laws,17 constructively confiscated all the plaintiff's records
and papers still located at its Swiss offices. The Government thereupon
moved for a dismissal under rule 37. The district court referred the
matter to a special master, who found that the plaintiff had at all times
acted in utmost good faith and had in no way conspired with the Swiss
authorities. Although the court accepted the master's findings, a dis-
missal with prejudice was granted.' s The Court of Appeals for the
8 F.R.D. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1948); Dictograph Products, Inc. v. Kentworth Corp., 7
F.R.D. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1947).
Conversely, cases have held that there can be no imposition of sanctions under rule
37 unless wilfulness is shown: Gill v. Stolow, 24o F.zd 669 (2d Cir. 1957); Ross v.
True Temper Corp., iI F.R.D. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Kiachif v. Philco Interna-
tional Corp., so F.R.D. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 595o).
1 5357 U.S. 197 (1958). [Hereinafter cited as Societe Internationale.]
2840 STAT. 419 (x99), as amended, 50 U.S.C. (App. 1952).
" Swiss PENAL CODE § 273; Swiss BANK LAW § 47.
"aSociete Internationale v. McGranery, III F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953). The
Court of Appeals modified the dismissal to allow an additional 6 months for compliance.
Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
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District of Columbia Circuit affirmed.' 9 In a unanimous opinion by
Mr. Justice Harlan, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the lower court and ordered a trial on the merits.2"
RULE 37 As THE EXCLUSIVE SOURCE OF SANCTIONING POWER UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES
The extent of excursions beyond the confines of rule 37 for sanction-
ing power is demonstrated by the background of the Societe Inter-
nationale case.2 ' When the district court granted the Government's mo-
tion for dismissal because of noncompliance with a discovery order issued
pursuant to rule 34, it did so on the basis of undefined inherent equity
powers,2 2 although the court acknowledged that rule 37 could have sup-
ported its ruling The court of appeals, affirming the judgment,
noted that the dismissal would more properly have been predicated upon
rule 41 (b):24
Rule 37, apart, Rule 41(b) would permit dismissal for 'failure'
of the plaintiff to comply with an order of the court, thus re-
flecting the power thought by the Rule framers to reside in the
court aside from the specific confines of Rule 37-
In retrospect, it is difficult to glean from the cases exactly why dis-
trict court judges have found it necessary to look beyond rule 37 for
sanctioning authority. The very text of the rule suggests that it, and
it alone, was to constitute the basis for pretrial punishments. This con-
tention is further fortified by the fact the rule directly follows the ten
discovery rules in that portion devoted to pretrial procedures. Yet, dis-
trict court judges not infrequently have utilized inappropriate rules and
the plentiful array of federal contempt statutes as alternate sources of
sanctioning power.2 5
In any event, it appears that the problem has been resolved by the
"Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 243 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted,
355 U.S. 812 (1957).
20 Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
22 Ibid.
" "[A] cdurt has inherent power to dismiss a suit, stay a trial or impose other
limitations on the right to proceed with trial when it is established a party plaintiff
has failed to comply with order of the court issued pursuant to its rules." Societe
Internationale v. McGranery, xix F. Supp. 435, 447 (D.D.C. 1953).
""The order of dismissal appears to be justified under Rule 3 7 (b)(2)(iii) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." I,. at 446.
"' Societe Internationale v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532, 538-39 (D.C. Cir. x955).
" See note i i supra.
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holding of the Societe Internationale case. The Supreme Court, after
examining the entire question of the source of sanctioning authority for
noncompliance with pretrial discovery orders under the federal rules,
stated:2
In our opinion, whether a court has power to dismiss a com-
plaint because of non-compliance with a production order depends
exclusively upon Rule 37, which addresses itself with particularity
to the consequences of a failure to make discovery.... There
is no need to resort to Rule 41(b), which appears in that part
of the Rules concerned with trials and which lacks specific refer-
ence to discovery.
The Court also criticized the use of nebulous "inherent powers" as em-
ployed by the court of appeals.17 This unequivocal stand by the Supreme
Court should suffice to curb the inappropriate use of rule 41(b) and
other alternative sources of sanctioning power.
The Court's words on this central problem in the discovery process
will undoubtedly have salutary effect. However, a specific amendment
to the rule seems, nevertheless, desirable. In any case, the Court's un-
qualified position will serve, at least, as an interim guidepost to the dis-
trict courts until such time as a definitive change to the rule is promul-
gated.
THE "REFusAL"---FAILURE" DICHOTOMY
Perhaps one of the more plausible reasons for expeditions beyond the
confines of rule 37 is the fact that, without apparent significance, the
headings of the four subdivisions of rule 37 alternate between the use
of the words "refusal" and "failure." One explanation for this incon-
sistency is that the framers vaguely desired to indicate that rule 37 was
to have application to cases where the disobedient party acted either
wilfully or merely negligently." Still other explanations have been
advanced. For example, perhaps the draftsmen of the rule intended
what they said, that those subdivisions headed "refusal" should apply
26 357 U.S. 197
, 
207 (1958).
""'Reliance upon . .. 'inherent power,' can only obscure analysis of the problem
before us." Ibid.
28 "It might be argued that the framers of rule 37 deliberately intended to make
the penalties under subdivision (d) available in any case of omission to obey a court
order, whether heedless or conscious, and for that reason used the word 'failure' in the
caption." Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Discovery, 58 COLUM. L. REV.
480, 490 0958).
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only to affirmative disobedience, while those subdivisions headed "fail-
ure" were to be invoked only in cases of omissive noncompliance. This
explanation is less than convincing, however, in as much as the main
caption of the rule reads simply: "Refusal to Make Discovery: Conse-
quences." (Emphasis added.)
Regardless of the reasons for this semantic incongruity in rule 37,
the practical effect has been that some courts have construed the rule
as applicable only to "affirmative refusals" and have, therefore, declined
to invoke the rule in cases of unintentional noncompliance. 29  Con-
versely, other courts have held that rule 37 is applicable only to such
latter failures and have, consequently, felt compelled to go elsewhere
for sanctioning authority when confronted with deliberate noncompli-
ance.
3 0
In the Societe Internationale case, the district court was enmeshed
in the uncertainy evoked by the "failure-refusal" dichotomy.3' The
Supreme Court, displaying concern with the problem, in its order
granting certiorari?2 expressly invited counsel on both sides to "discuss
... the power of the District Court to dismiss... petitioner's complaint
under Rule 37(b)(2) . . . for failure to obey its [discovery] order
... in the absence of evidence and of findings that the petitioner 'refuses
"
9 An example is Maresco v. Lambert, z F.R.D. 163 (E.D.N.Y. x94i). The de-
fendant moved for a dismissal under rule 3 7 (d) because the plaintiff's attorney had
negligently failed to comply with a discovery order. The court declined to punish the
recusant since "the client should not suffer in this instance because of the lawyer's fault."
See also Pang-Tsu Mow v. Republic of China, 201 F.2d x95 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (x953) Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677 ( 9th Cir. 1944)); Sanib
Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. x955); Spencer v. Hitz Con-
struction Co., sS FED. RULES SERV. 3 7d. 3 1, Case 2 (D. Mont. July 14, 1952).
"Duell v. Duell, 7 F.R.D. 334 (D.D.C. 1947), reversed, 178 F.zd 683 (D.C.
Cir. 194.9); Crosley Radio Corp. v. Hieb, 4o F. Supp. 26x (S.D. Iowa 1941).
' "The order of dismissal appears to be justified under Rule 3 7(b) (z) (iii) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 3 7 (b)(i) provides that refusal (emphasis
added) to be sworn or to answer a question may be considered a contempt of court.
Of course, contempt of court involves a wilful act. -Rule 37 (d) ennumerates the sanc-
tions which may be imposed for the qwilful failure to appear or to serve answers. Here
the word 'wilful' is used. These two rules therefore dearly deal with wilful acts.
However, Rule 37(b)(2)(iii) makes no mention of contempt or wilful refusal. The
word 'refusal' is defined as synonymous with 'declination' . . . . In this case we have
noted that the plaintiff with the ... papers in his actual possession has 'refused' or 'de-,
dined' to exhibit ... as ordered by this court. That plaintiff may have had good reason
for its refusal would make the act nonetheless a refusal." Societe Internationale v.
McGranery, "Is F. Supp. 435, 446 (D.D.C. 1953).
as 355 U.S. 812 0I957).
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to obey... ." Apparently, the Court's consideration of this dilemma
has produced a solution :33
[W]e think that a party 'refuses to obey' simply by failing to
comply with an order. So construed the Rule allows a court all
the flexibility it might need in framing an order appropriate to a
particular situation.
It thus appears that the Court considers that the oscillation between
"refusal" and "failure" in the text of the rule was designed to enable
district courts to apply any part of rule 37 as appropriate to the cir-
cumstan ces of any particular case. So interpreted, the exercise of great
discretion is permissible, and the need for going beyond rule 37 is obvi-
ated.
THE ELEMENT OF WILFULNESS
Recognizing that the "wilfulness labyrinth" 4 also required clarifica-
tion, the Court in the Societe Internationale case undertook to resolve the
issue in so far as the facts of that case permitted.35 The Court found
the district court had erred in dismissing the suit with prejudice, since
the petitioner's noncompliance was fostered by an inability not of its own
making and "not [due] to wvilfalness, bad faith, or any fault of the
petitioner.136 (Emphasis added.) The quoted language seems to in-
dicate that a court may not dismiss an action with prejudice under rule
37 unless wilfulness is affirmatively shown. An earlier portion of the
opinion, however, suggests that the Court would not necessarily dis-
approve a sanction based solely on involuntary noncompliance, but that
"357 U.S. 197
, 
2o8 (1958).
3' See note 14 supra.
"This issue of wilfulness is intertwined with the concept of what constitutes "con-
trol" within the purview of rule 34. As a result, were the court to take a liberal view
of what is control, the policies of the Trading with the Enemy Act would not be
subserved because an enemy alien would find it easier to form fictitious corporations or
to employ similar devices to evade the consequences of the Act.
. "The propriety of the use to which [rule 34] is put depends upon the circumstances
of a given case, and we hold only that accommodation of the Rule in this instance to
the policies underlying the Trading with the Enemy Act justified the action of the
District Court in issuing the production order." Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 2o6 (1958).
The policy of the Trading with the Enemy Act was stated by the Court in the leading
case of Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, A.G., 332 U.S. 480, 985 (947): "[T]o
reach enemy interests which masqueraded under . . . innocent fronts."
"Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958).
[Vol. 7959: 278
Vol. 1959: 27s] PRETRIAL DISCOVERY SANCTIONS 287
the punishment dispensed should be commensurate with the quality of
the recusant's conduct.37
The peculiar facts of the Societe Internationale case preclude any
assumption that the decision has totally resolved the wilfulness contro-
versy.38  It must be borne in mind that the petitioner did make ex-
tensive efforts to comply with the pretrial discovery order and that it
was the interdiction of the laws of a friendly foreign power which pre-
vented complete compliance.39 The fact that the legislation of a for-
eign nation was involved may have influenced the Court, since a lack
of solicitude for the laws of another country might adversely affect our
international relations.
CONSTITUTIONAL PITFALLS
The Court in the Societe Internationale case noted, but neatly
avoided, certain constitutional questions which arise when a case is dis-
missed with prejudice before a full trial on the merits because of non-
compliance with a pretrial discovery order.40  The problem becomes
especially acute where, as in the instant case, the recusant made extensive
good faith efforts to comply.
The constitutional basis of procedural rules authorizing dismissals for
noncompliance with pretrial orders before a trial on the merits was
first authoritatively stated in the case of Hovey v. Elliot.41  There, the
" "Whatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the production order. Such
reasons, and the wilfulness or good faith of the petitioner, can hardly affect the fact
of non-compliance and are relevant only to the path which the district court might
follow in dealing with the petitioner's failure to comply." Id. at 2oS.
'a See note 35 supra.
"The Court cautioned that the situation in the Societe lnternationale case is to be
distinguished from non-compliance which is engendered by fear that disclosure might
expose the recusant to prosecution under the laws of another nation. In the instant case,
compliance itself was a criminal act under Swiss law.
The Court said: "It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes
a weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws
preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign. Of course this situation should
be distinguished from one where a party claims that compliance with a court's order
will reveal facts which may provide basis for criminal prosecution of that party under
the penal laws of a foreign sovereign thereby shown to have been violated. . . . Here
the findings below establish that the very fact of compliance by disclosure of ... records
will itself constitute the initial violation...." Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 211 (1958).
, "The provisions of Rule 37 which are here involved must be read in light of the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process of law. . . ." Id. at 2o9.
41 167 U.S. 409 (1897). The Court was most emphatic in its view: "[A] more
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Supreme Court held that dismissal solely for punishment was repugnant
to the due process clause of the Constitution.42 This holding, rendered
in 1897, was modified in 1909 in the case of Hammond Packing Co. v.
Arkansas,4" where the Court held that sanctions for noncompliance with
pretrial discovery orders were not unconstitutional because: 44
[In this case] the preservation of due process was secured by
the presumption that the refusal to produce evidence material
to the administration of due process was but an admission of
want of merit in the asserted defense.
It would thus appear that denying a trial merely because of dis-
obedience to a pretrial discovery order, despite a good faith effort toward
compliance by the recusant, is a denial of due process. 4' The holding in
Hovey v. Elliot definitely establishes that dismissal as punishment per
se is unconstitutional. Constitutionality, therefore, must riecessarily de-
pend on the "presumption" rationale of the Hammond Packing Co. case.
Yet, it does not seem logical to presume that a party has no faith in his
defense if he diligently attempts to comply with the court's order but
is frustrated in his endeavor by force beyond his control.46
fundamental question yet remains . . . whether a court possessing plenary power to
punish for contempt . .. unlimited by statute, has the right to . . . refuse to allow
the party summoned to answer or strike his answer ...suppress the testimony in his
favor, and condemn him without consideration thereof and without a hearing, on
the theory that he has been guilty of . . . contempt. . . . The mere statement of this
proposition would seem, in reason and conscience, to render imperative a negative
answer. The fundamental conception of a court of justice is condemnation only after
hearing." Id. at 413-14.
42 "[W]e rest our decision on the want of power in the courts of the District of
Columbia to suppress an answer of parties defendant, and after so doing to render a
decree pro confesso as in case of default for want of an answer. . . . Id. at 447-
S7212 U.S. 322 (1909). "Id. at 351.
"The framers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were keenly aware of the
constitutional difficulties which might present themselves in the field of pretrial dis-
covery sanctions. In their notes to the draft of rule 37, the Advisory Committee said:
"The provisions of this rule authorizing orders establishing facts or excluding evi-
dence or striking pleadings, or authorizing judgments of dismissal or default, for
refusal to answer questions or permit inspection or otherwise make discovery, are in
accord with Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322 (i9o9), which dis-
tinguishes between the justifiable use of such measures as a means of compelling the
production of evidence, and their unjustifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S.
409 (1897), for the mere purpose of punishing for contempt." ADVISORY COMMIrTTEE
ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOrEs TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
DIsTRicT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1938), quoted in 4 MOORE, FEDERAL
PRACrICE § 37.01, 2803-04 (ad ed. 195o).
" "These two decisions leave open the question whether Fifth Amendment due
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The facts of the Societe Internationale case well illustrate the con-
stitutional danger which lurks within rule 37: The plaintiff was ordered
to produce papers under the terms of rule 34. He made extensive efforts
to comply and had actually produced a substantial amount of the re-
quested material. Yet, the court granted the Government's motion for a
dismissal with prejudice under rule 37, despite positive findings by a
court appointed master that the plaintiff had at all times acted with un-
questioned good faith.
The constitutional issue is best viewed against the background of its
own history. In the Hovey case a decree pro confesso was entered after
striking the defendant's answer, as punishment for his refusal to obey
a court order for production of papers. Significantly, the ratio decidendi
indicated that in the past, courts had considered the practice of curt dis-
missals for pretrial disobedience permissible under our Constitution, since
it was thought to have been sanctioned by the common law courts, par-
ticularly in Chancery.4" Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court,
process is violated by the striking of a complaint because of a plaintiff's inability, despite
good faith efforts, to comply with a pretrial production order. The presumption
utilized by the Court in the Hammond case might well falter under such circum-
stances.... Certainly substantial constitutional questions are provoked by such action.'
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 210 (1958).
The problem of the constitutionality of certain presumptions such as that used by
the Court in the Hammond Packing Co. case is an old one. The most difficult prob-
lems regarding presumptions, however, are presented in the field of legislation. Perhaps
the leading case on the subject is Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943), wherein it
was held that a statutory presumption does not comport with the requirements of due
process unless there is a "rational connection" between the facts proved and the ultimate
fact presumed. There seems to be no compelling reason why judicially created pre-
sumptions should not be similarly viewed. The ramifications of the Tot case are ably
discussed in Note, 56 HAPv. L. REV. 1324 (1943). See also: Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 8z 0934) ; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1 (1979) ; Bailey v. Alabama, 219
U.S. 219 (1xx) ; 4 WIGMORF EVIDENCE §§ 1353-56 ( 3 d ed. 1940).
"'Societe Internationale v. McGranery, xxI F. Supp. 435 ().D.C. x955).
"' "We are brought to the conclusion that there has long been exerted by the Court
of Chancery in England the power to refuse to hear the defendant when he was in
contempt of the court by disobeying its orders, and that that power was in the Courts
of Chancery of this country." Walker v. Walker, 8z N.Y. z6o, 264 (188o).
"[A]ccording to an unbroken chain of authorities, reaching back to the earliest
times, such power [to punish for contempt], although arbitrary in its nature and liable
to abuse, is absolutely essential to the protection of the courts in the discharge of their
functions.' Ex parte Terry, 1z8 U.S. 289, 313 (s888).
"It seems to have been the ancient common law rule that where a party was
charged with a constructive contempt of court-that is, with doing some act in dis-
obedience of the court's order not in the presence of the court--he could answer under
oath; and if by his answer be purged himself of the contempt, he was discharged."
Carson v. Ennis, 146 Ga. 726, 728-29, 92 S.E. 22, 222 (1917).
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demonstrated by a rich and thorough examination of every authoritative
source of the common law that the practice of dismissal with prejudice
for punishment49
. .. is based upon a too strict and literal rendering of general
language to be found in isolated passages contained in the works
of writers on ancient law ... and on loose statements as to the
practice of the Court of Chancery....
Thus, it can be perceived that the entire concept of dismissal with
prejudice for noncompliance with pretrial discovery orders, at least
to the extent that it has been accepted, is actually based on a weak con-
stitutional rationalization conceived on a misinterpretation of certain
anachronistic common law practices."0 Nonetheless, the constitutional
propriety of pretrial sanctions was somewhat fortified by the nuances of
Hammond Packing Co.
From the situations presented in cases such as Societe Internationale,
it is to be gathered that an undeniable constitutional- problem exists and
should be resolved. Since the Supreme Court cannot eliminate the prob-
lem by judicial pronouncement unless the question is presented in a case
or controversy, it would appear that the most desirable approach lies
in outright amendment to rule 37. Any proposed amendment should
stipulate unequivocally that an involuntary dismissal with prejudice can-
not be invoked unless the recusant is in wilful bad faith and has, by his
conduct, demonstrated a discernible lack of confidence in the merits of
his case.
By so amending the rule, another complementary problem would
be simultaneously resolved. Since the rule, in its present form, is am-
biguous upon the necessity, for wilfulness under rule 37, a positive ex-
pression to the effect that bad faith and wilfulness are necessary from
a constitutional standpoint would eliminate any doubt concerning the
quality of conduct required before the power of rule 37 can be invoked.
"Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.s. 409, 419 (.897).
'o "The demonstration of the unsoundness of the contention that courts of equity
have claimed and exercised the power to suppress an answer and thereupon render a decyee
pro confesso, which results from the foregoing review of the authorities, is strengthendd
by the reflection that if such power obtained, then the ancient common law doctrine of
'outlawry,' and that of the continental systems as to 'civil death,' would be a part of the
chancery law, a theory which could not be admitted without violating the rudimentusy
conceptions of *the fundamental rights of the citizen." Id. at 444.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Societe Internationale case will be viewed as a sub-
stantial advance in the field of discovery, the flaws in rule 37 are not
completely rectified. Amendment and modification are still very much
in order. Moreover, it must be recognized.that the formal wording of
rule 37 does not present the most insuperable obstacle to its effective
administration. Should the text of the rule be amended and re-
interpreted so as to attain the ultimate in clarity and understanding,
the task still would be by no means complete. A set of rules-par-
ticularly procedural rules-is no better, no more effective than the
quality of its application. Uniform and realistic judicial enforcement,
then, is the final, but controlling, goal to be pursued.
It is undeniable that the framers of the Rules contemplated that
rule 37 should be an instrument of drastic action against those who would
thwart the discovery process. The tendency, however, has been to with-
hold serious sanctions in return for promises by the recusant to comply
at some future time. The reluctance to mete out the full measure of
punishment that the circumstances might require is, in the main, attrib-
utable to hesitancy to harm an innocent litigant who might be victimized
by the errors of his attorney, or to the hope that the suit might eventu-
ally be. resolved on the merits, conditioned upon future compliance.
What is the net result of this diluted judicial application? The prin-
cipal result is that rule 37 has been relegated too often to the station of
"merely another procedural technicality," to be lived with or tolerated,
rather than respected and observed. On the other hand, the over-
zealous judge who terrorizes a party by an unnecessarily severe policy
concerning the discovery process is as aberrational as is the lenient judge
who ever seeks to cajole a party into compliance by continually allowing
another chance.
Recognizing that discovery can be, and has been, used as a means of
harassing the opposite side, and that discovery can cause unnecessary
hardship to an innocent client, the federal courts must chart a middle
course which insures compliance and uniformity; which permits firmness,
yet justice.
